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cized by the best text authority. See 1 WYMAN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS, §653, where it is said, "Logical though it
may be, it (the rule for natural gas) seems to the writer
to be lacking in appreciation of the situation as a whole.
A rule which may result in satisfactory service to none, not
even to the applicant in question is hardly consistent with
public service for all. Certainly where the supply now
available is not sufficient to meet the proper demands of
present customers, it would seem that later appllicants
could not demand the reduction of the taking of older
customers."
See also an article by Thomas P. Hardman
in 26 W. VA. L. QUAR. 224, 231, where the question is discussed with reference to the constitutional right of a state
to prohibit the exportation of its natural resources. It will
be noticed that the natural gas rulei is based on the theory
of unjust discrimination. Admitting that there is discrimination in favor of prior consumers, should the rule against
discrimination be invoked? It is apparent that such a rule
is opposed to the common law theory that a public utility
must render adequate service. To require a public utility
to render service to tardy applicants, when the supply is
sufficient for present customers only, results in inadequate
service for all. Such a rule of law seems unjust, unreasonable, and uneconomic.
-Hugh R. Warder.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-LIABILITY OF

PRINCIPAL -

SCOPE

OF EMPLOYMENT.-The plaintiff, while shopping in the store

of the defendants, was seen by a clerk to fold up some
small dresses, and to attempt to make away with them.
The clerk brought her back, rescued thd goods, and turned
her over to the manager. No further search was made,
but the manager detained the plaintiff while awaiting the
arrival of an officer for whom he had sent. The plaintiff,
attempting to escape, gained the sidewalk, but the manager
pursued her, and by shoving her, forced her back into the
store. The plaintiff alleges that she was injured by the
acts of the manager, and asks damages for said injuries, as
well as for nervousness suffered by her daughter, who had
accompanied her, in consequence of such acts. Held, that
the defendants were not liable for these acts of the agent,
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since he acted without the scope of his employment. But
the court in deciding the case, gives as one general reason
for its decision, that "an agent cannot be said to be acting
within the, scope of his agency, if the act complained of,
if done by the master would be unlawful." Pruittv. Watson, et
al., 138 S. E. 331 (W. Va. 1927).
It would seem that such a proposition, when stated in
the form of a general rule, is rather too broad when applied to all cases arising under this category. Andi judging from the current of authority, this unqualified statement has failed to meet with approbation. 18 R. C. L. 804;
26 Cyc. 1525; 39 C. J. 1283, 1284; 26 Cyc. 1529. The principal is held liable in cases of assault committed within the
scope of the agent's employment. Davis v. Merrill, 133 Va.
69, 112 S. E. 628; Vance v. Frantz, 83 W. Va. 671, 99 S. E.
12; Railway Company v. Cooper, 6 Ind. App. 202, 33 N. E.
219. The principal is also held civilly liable for criminal acts
of the agent, committed within the scope of the agent's employment. Great Southern Lumber Company v. Williams, 17
F. (2d) 469; E. L DuPontCompany v. Snead's Administrator,
124 Va. 177, 97 S. E. 812; Merrill v. Coates, 101 Minn. 43,
111 N. W. 836; Caswell v. Cross, 120 Mass. 545; Rose v.
ImperialEngine Company, 195 N. Y. 515, 88 N. E. 1130; Cincinnati,Hamilton & Dayton Railway Company v. Klute, 73 Oh.
St. 380, 78 N. E. 1120; 18 R. C. L. 804, 805, 806. The
same may be said of cases of false imprisonment. Staples v.
Schmid, 18 R. I. 224, 26 Atl. 193; Martin v. Golden, 180 Mass.
549, 62 N. E. 977; Mosely v. McCrory Company, 101 W. Va.
480, 133 S. E. 73; Palmeri v. Manhattan Railway Company,
133 N. Y. 261, 30 N. E. 1001. Such has also been held in
libel cases. Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 2
Exch. 259 (1867); Fogg v. Boston Railroad Company, 148
Mass. 513, 20 N. E. 109 v PhiladelphiaCompany v. Quigley,
21 How. (Pa.) 202; and so for the acts of negligence of the
agent. Walker v. Strosnider, 67 W. Va. 39, 67 S. E. 1087;
Lamarre v. Guarantee ConstructionCompany, 214 Mass. 326,
101 N. E. 990; Joel v. Morrison, 6 C & P 501; STOREY,
AGENCY (6th ed.) §452; Gregory's Administrator v. Ohio
River RailroadCompany, 37 W. Va. 606, 614, 16 S. E. 819. It
has also been held that in cases of mixed motive, the principal may be held liable for violation of statutes or ordi-
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nances, and that, even though there were implied orders
that the agent was not to violate such statutes or ordinances.
Howe v. Newmarch, 94 Mass. 49; Sadler v. Henlock, 4 E. & B.
570; Healy v. Johnson, 127 Ia. 237, 103 N. W. 92; State v.
Nichols, 67 W. Va. 659, 69 S. E. 304; State v. Denoon, 31 W.
Va. 122, 5 S. E. 315. Similarly in public carrier cases, Weed
et al., v. PanamaRailrod Company, 17 N. Y. 362, 72 Am. Dec.
474; Seymour v. Greenwood, 6 N. & R' 359. In Christie v.
Mitchell, 93 W. Va. 200, 116 S. E. 715, it was held, where the
plaintiff was a trespasser, that even wilful and reckless acts
injuring the plaintiff were in the scope off the agent's employment, and the principal was held liable. In all of these
cases the tort committed by the agent, for which the principal was held liable, would be a tort (and hence unlawful) none the less if committed by the principal. Therefore, the above-mentioned proposition is too broad to be
used as a set general rule. "The test is not whether the
act is lawful or unlawful, but is whether or not such measures were so far incident to the employment as, to come
within its scope." Voegeli v. Pickel Marble and Granite
Company, 49 Mo. App. 643. See also Dolan v. Hubinger, 109
Ia. 408, 80 N. W. 514; 39 C. J. 1283, 1284 and note in 27
L. R. A. 161.
The conclusion of the court in the case is, however,
correct, since in the absence of a clear authorization, a
principal is not liable in such a case, as the assault
was made not in furtherance of the principal's business,
but for the unauthorized purpose of vindicating the law,
and is, hence, not an act impliedly within the scope of the
agent's employment. MECHEM, AGENCY, §1974, and cases
there cited. To designate this line of distinction more
clearly let us illustrate. (a) An agent detains the supposed
thief for the purpose of recovering the goods; (b) after recovery, the agent detains the suspect solely for the purpose
of turning him over to an officer of the law. In (a) the
agent is only acting to recover the goods of the principal,
there being ai%implied duty on the part of the agent to
protect his principal's property from pilfering, and to recover stolen property rightfully belonging to his principal.
Staples v. Schmid, supra. Thus the act was within the scope
of the agent's employment, and for the act- the principal
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would be liable (except for unreasonable acts of the agent)
whether the act was lawful or unlawful.
But in (b) we enter the domain of the agent's attempt at a
vindication of the law (i.e., holding the suspect after his principal's property has been recovered.) In the absence of authorization the agent acts as a good citizen, rather than for his
principal, and therefore the act is not within the scope of his
employment. MECHEM, AGENCY (2nd ed.) §1974. In such a
case, the principal has not employed the agent for the purpose of vindicating the law, and such act is in no way incident to the agent's employment, or within its scope.
-Lester C. Hess.
COUNTY COURTS

-

CONTRACTS

-

INTEREST OF MEMBERS

THEREIN.-Plaintiffs seek an injunction to prevent the purchase of certain land by the county court for use as a site
for courthouse and jail. It is shown that this land adjoins
land owned by a member of the county court; that that
member moved to purchase the land; and, that the vote on
the question was two for and one against the purchase. It
is alleged that the contract is illegal in contemplation of Ch.
39, §8b of the WEST VIRGINIA CODE (1923) which provides:
"and it shall be unlawful for any member of the county
court, or any other tribunal established in lieu thereof, to be
directly or indirectly interested in any contract for furnishing supplies for the poor, or in any other contract for any
purpose whatever, in which the county shall be in any way
interested." Held, Where the county court proposes to buy
land for public use, the fact that one of the members of the
county court owns adjoining property will not disqualify
him for voting for the purchase on the ground of interest,
where it is not shown that the purchase will increase the
value, or necessitate the purchase of his property. Beall et
at. v. Brooke County Court, 138 S. E. 730 (W. Va. 1927).
It is submitted that this sort of statutory provision, so
generally found in the laws of the states, is for the purpose
of securing to the public as large a measure of freedom
from political corruption as possible. Lumber Co. v. McIntyre
et:al., 100 Wis. 245, 75 N. W. 964. If this is the reason for the
law it might well be held that any interest of a member of
the county court, direct or indirect, large or small, would
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